# \[CVE-2021-22942\] Possible Open Redirect in Host Authorization Middleware

**URL:** <https://discuss.rubyonrails.org/t/cve-2021-22942-possible-open-redirect-in-host-authorization-middleware/78722>\
**Category:** Security Announcements\
**Created:** [August 19, 2021, 4:39pm UTC](https://discuss.rubyonrails.org/t/cve-2021-22942-possible-open-redirect-in-host-authorization-middleware/78722 "2021-08-19T16:39:08Z")\
**Posts on this page:** 1\
**Page:** 1

<div class="post-metadata">

**Author:** ![tenderlove](https://sea2.discourse-cdn.com/rubyonrails/user_avatar/discuss.rubyonrails.org/tenderlove/32/3541_2.png) [@tenderlove](https://discuss.rubyonrails.org/u/tenderlove)\
**Post date:** [August 19, 2021, 4:39pm UTC](https://discuss.rubyonrails.org/t/cve-2021-22942-possible-open-redirect-in-host-authorization-middleware/78722/1 "2021-08-19T16:39:08Z")

</div>

# Possible Open Redirect in Host Authorization Middleware

There is a possible open redirect vulnerability in the Host Authorization middleware in Action Pack. This vulnerability has been assigned the CVE identifier CVE-2021-22942.

Versions Affected: \>= 6.0.0. Not affected: \< 6.0.0 Fixed Versions: 6.1.4.1, 6.0.4.1

## Impact

Specially crafted “X-Forwarded-Host” headers in combination with certain “allowed host” formats can cause the Host Authorization middleware in Action Pack to redirect users to a malicious website.

Impacted applications will have allowed hosts with a leading dot. For example, configuration files that look like this:

```ruby
config.hosts << '.EXAMPLE.com'

```

When an allowed host contains a leading dot, a specially crafted Host header can be used to redirect to a malicious website.

This vulnerability is similar to CVE-2021-22881, but CVE-2021-22881 did not take in to account domain name case sensitivity.

## Releases

The fixed releases are available at the normal locations.

## Workarounds

In the case a patch can’t be applied, the following monkey patch can be used in an initializer:

```ruby
module ActionDispatch
  class HostAuthorization
    HOSTNAME = /[a-z0-9.-]+|\[[a-f0-9]*:[a-f0-9.:]+\]/i
    VALID_ORIGIN_HOST = /\A(#{HOSTNAME})(?::\d+)?\z/
    VALID_FORWARDED_HOST = /(?:\A|,[]?)(#{HOSTNAME})(?::\d+)?\z/

    private
      def authorized?(request)
        origin_host = request.get_header("HTTP_HOST")&.slice(VALID_ORIGIN_HOST, 1) || ""
        forwarded_host = request.x_forwarded_host&.slice(VALID_FORWARDED_HOST, 1) || ""
        @permissions.allows?(origin_host) && (forwarded_host.blank? || @permissions.allows?(forwarded_host))
      end
  end
end

```

## Patches

To aid users who aren’t able to upgrade immediately we have provided patches for the two supported release series. They are in git-am format and consist of a single changeset.

- 6-0-host-authorzation-open-redirect.patch - Patch for 6.0 series
- 6-1-host-authorzation-open-redirect.patch - Patch for 6.1 series

Please note that only the 6.1.Z, 6.0.Z, and 5.2.Z series are supported at present. Users of earlier unsupported releases are advised to upgrade as soon as possible as we cannot guarantee the continued availability of security fixes for unsupported releases.

## Credits

Thanks to [@mshtawy](https://hackerone.com/mshtawy?type=user) for reporting this!

[6-0-host-authorzation-open-redirect.patch](https://discuss.rubyonrails.org/uploads/short-url/4SnZzuOjuxtcRaJRLXKX37cVmy4.patch) (5.9 KB) [6-1-host-authorzation-open-redirect.patch](https://discuss.rubyonrails.org/uploads/short-url/fOROmwJxsyLVKpZo0UO53Dd25u4.patch) (6.1 KB)